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Swedish labor market programs appear large from an international perspective, yet their 
consequences are not fully investigated and understood. In this paper we estimate a 
switching regression model with training effect modeled as a random coefficient, 
partitioned in an observed and unobserved component. We investigate labor market 
training for three cohorts during the 80s and the beginning of the 90s on its effect on 
earnings. We separate the analysis between Swedish-born and foreign-born individuals 
to identify differences in their responses to training. The results indicate that there is 
positive sorting into training. We find that the proportion of trainees having positive 
rewards from training was not very different from the proportion having negative 
rewards. This means that the results do not support the view that from efficiency 
considerations, too few persons were enrolled in labor market training during this 
period. Differences in results across cohorts can be interpreted as being caused by rapid 
changes in the labor market. Further, consistent with results from several previous 
studies we find that being young often means no positive pay-off from training, and the 
same is found for persons with only primary education. In conflict with what earlier 
studies have shown, we found that males have a better pay-off from training than 
females. Rewards from training were higher for foreign-born than for natives and 
rewards among the former vary by place of birth. 
 
Keywords: labor market training, non-experimental estimator, positive sorting, 
unobserved heterogeneity to training reward, random coefficient model. 
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1 Introduction 
The efforts industrialized countries make to train the unemployed and persons at risk of 
becoming unemployed vary dramatically. Statistics for the 90s for example (OECD 
1997, 2000) show one group made up of the Czech Republic, Japan, Luxembourg, 
Poland and the USA where public expenditures on labor market training programs were 
less than 0.05% of GDP. The other extreme, with public expenditures on labor market 
training programs of around 0.5% of GDP or higher is found in the Scandinavian 
countries (Denmark, Finland and Sweden). Of the three, Sweden has the longest record 
of allocating massive funds to labor-market training programs. The extensive public 
involvement in training the unemployed in Sweden started at the beginning of the 1960s 
although it is possible to find even earlier efforts. During the 60s the number of 
participants in training, henceforth trainees, increased rapidly, after which followed 
several examples of counter-cyclical changes. 
Who receives training? This is a central issue when setting up as well as evaluating 
labor market training programs. The selection of trainees can be affected by the 
preferences of potential trainees as well as by the officials responsible for recruiting 
trainees, who in turn must follow instructions dictated by politicians. Starting with a 
potential trainee, one obvious reason for applying is the perception that the training 
program will improve his or her future position in the labor market when compared to 
not taking part in the training. 
Turning to the role of placement officers, it can be noted that in Sweden public 
employment offices have a central role of assigning job seekers to training courses. 
These officers are responsible for providing information on different courses, eligibility 
rules, training stipends etc. The main motivation for assigning a person to labor market 
training is that the training should lead to a permanent job. Those eligible are mainly 
unemployed job seekers and individuals at risk of becoming unemployed. A person can 
also be eligible for other reasons. For example, political refugee status makes a 
foreigner eligible for training within a certain time limit after arrival. 
How does training affect a person’s subsequent labor market situation? Obviously 
training can increase the human capital of the trainee by increasing skills. Even if 
training only serves to preserve the human capital the effect is positive if the alternative   4
(of continued unemployment) leads to decreased work-capacity. However, there can 
also be other mechanisms affecting the future labor market situation of a trainee. 
Taking part in training might lower the person’s reservation wage, making the person 
more likely to accept a work offer and thereby more likely to be employed. However, 
being involved in a training program might lead to reduced job search intensity. If this 
is the case, training can reduce the rate at which job offers arrive, thus reducing 
employment opportunities. Still another mechanism at work is that a certificate of a 
completed training course might act as a positive (negative) signal to potential 
employers. Such persons can be perceived as more (less) ambitious and therefore more 
(less) productive than other job-searchers. 
Given the considerable resources spent on labor market training programs in 
Sweden, it is not surprising that training programs have been subject to several research 
efforts. Some authors have studied the enrolment in labor market training programs and 
the choice set of the unemployed [Brännäs & Eriksson (1996), Eriksson (1997), 
Melkersson (1999)]. A number of studies have used non-experimental methods to 
evaluate the subsequent labor market performance of trainees. Some of these studies 
have focused on particular groups. Examples include Edin (1988) who studied training 
among workers displaced by a pulp plant closing in 1977, in a small town in the north 
of Sweden; Ackum (1991) who studied persons aged 16-24 in Stockholm in 1981; and 
Larsson (2000) who analyzed persons aged 20-24 that became unemployed during 1992 
and 1993. 
Still other studies have analyzed samples taken from the whole country and without 
any narrow restrictions on the age of the trainee; this is the approach taken in this paper. 
There are four previous studies, which in this aspect are similar to ours. First, Björklund 
& Moffitt (1987) who distinguished between effects for the average and the marginal 
participant. Using data from the second half of the 70s in which relatively few trainees 
are found, the average effects were found to be positive while the marginal impacts 
were found to be negative. Axelsson (1989) compared a sample of 900 persons who 
completed labor market training programs in 1981 with various control groups. 
Outcomes, one and two years after the training, were evaluated by several variables. 
The results show programs to have a significant positive effect on annual earnings 
amounting to about 20% in 1983.   5
Another study is Regnér (1993, 1997) where the research strategy is similar but the 
samples larger and the econometric method of a later vintage. The study investigated 
training that took place during 1989 and 1990. The results indicate that training did not 
increase subsequent earnings of the trainee. AMS (1995) used the same econometric 
methods, but analyzed persons who received training in 1992 and 1994 along with 
control groups. It was found that subsequent earnings for the second cohort (as 
measured half a year later) were positive, but were negative (although not significant), 
for the first cohort (as measured two years after training). 
Our study is inspired by the studies mentioned above but differs in a number of 
aspects. First, we study three different training cohorts; people who received training 
during the two-year periods of 1984 and 1985, 1987 and 1988, and 1990 and 1991. The 
macroeconomic climate varied across these cohorts as the unemployment rate in 
Sweden fell from a maximum of 3.5% in 1983, reached a minimum of 1.5% in 1989, 
rose to 3.0% in 1991, and more or less exploded to 8.2% in 1993. Thus we are able to 
investigate if the outcome of labor market training is affected by the macroeconomic 
climate, hypothesizing that positive earning effects are easier to find when there is 
excess demand. 
Second, foreign-born persons make up a considerable proportion of all people in 
labor training in Sweden. We consider this fact at the outset in the sampling process and 
work with different samples for natives and foreign-born. This research strategy is also 
motivated by the fact that immigrants often are enrolled in courses other than the 
courses natives are enrolled in, a fact which provides a strong argument for working 
with different samples of natives and foreigners. 
We follow the three cohorts of trainees and their control groups for three years after 
completed training. As the primary outcome variable we analyze annual earnings. In the 
econometric strategy we follow Björklund and Moffitt (1987). We estimate a switching 
regression model while allowing for unobserved heterogeneity with respect to the 
reward on training. This allows us to investigate how the reward is distributed over the 
individuals and their observed characteristics. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: In the next section the theoretical 
framework is laid out while the empirical specification and parameters of interest are   6
discussed in Section 3. The data is presented in Section 4. Section 5 presents and 
discusses the results and in Section 6 we sum up the conclusions.  
 
2 The economics of sorting 
To discuss the economics of sorting, it is convenient to define two states (treatment and 
no-treatment) with respect to the outcome variable of interest. We are interested in 
earnings and the effect on earnings from training. Hence we define two earnings 
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A linear decomposition with an additively separable representation is assumed, X 
being a vector of observables and U1 and U0 being mean zero unobservables of the 
individual. Subscript 1 represents the state of potential earnings if the individual 
participates and completes a training program and 0 the state of potential earnings if the 
individual chooses not to participate in a program. It is assumed that training takes place 
only once, during a fixed period of time, and no other training has taken place or will 
take place in the future. Assuming that the individual wishes to maximize the future 
earnings, the decision to undergo treatment is made on the basis of a net reward 
function:    
   10 * DY YC C = −−= α −             (2) 
 
D* is a latent variable representing the net reward from training, C the cost 
associated with training, and α the gross reward in terms of earnings. C can be thought 
of as some non-earnings related considerations that are relevant to the decision to 
undertake treatment such as tuition, stigma, distance to training center etc. When C = 0 
the model coincides with the so-called Roy-Model (cf. Roy, 1951 and Heckman and 
Honoré, 1990) where an individual’s decision to participate in training is a function of   7
potential earnings only.
1 In general, costs are relevant and include variables beside those 
included in X, capturing differences in costs across individuals. 
To specify the model further, we formalize the reward and the cost. A general 
formulation of the model would allow for observed and unobserved heterogeneity in 
both the rewards and costs associated with training. It is therefore natural to define 
separate behavioral equations for rewards and costs both of which include observed and 
unobserved components: 
Reward:  α = Zγ + εα              (3) 
Cost:  C = Wδ + εc              (4) 
 
The unobserved component of the reward equation (3) is defined as the difference 
between the residuals of the state specific earnings equations (εα = U1 – U0 ) and from 
(2), (3) and (4), the unobserved component of the decision function (D*) is the 
difference between the unobserved components in (3) and (4) (ε = εα - εc). The full 
model is now defined and we have access to three behavioral components. The 
behavioral terms (U1, U0, ε) are assumed to be independent of the exogenous variables 




ε) and covariances (σij) for i,j = 1,0. The covariances 
of the pairs (ε, U1), (ε, U0) are denoted  σ1ε  and  σ0ε. The individual’s decision to 
participate is based on perfect foresight of future net reward. That is if D* is positive the 
individual will participate in training. In the opposite case, no training will take place 
for the individual. Relaxing this assumption by assuming that only the expected value of 
the net reward is known by the individual would not change the reduced form of the 
decision rule, although ε would not include U1 and U0. 
 To discuss the economics of sorting into the two states we will refer to U1 and U0 as 
state-specific skills [Heckman and Honoré (1990), Vella et al. (1998)]. When σ10 < 0 
the state-specific skills are negatively correlated and we have a comparative advantage 
structure. That is, on average those who perform relatively well with the treatment will 
perform relatively less well without the treatment. When σ10 > 0 the state-specific skills 
are positively correlated and we have a hierarchical structure, where on average those 
individuals who perform well in one state, also perform relatively well in the other state. 
                                                 
1 This model also goes under the name the Neyman-Fisher-Cox-Roy-Quandt-Ruben model, especially at 
the University of Chicago.   8
The conditional expectations of the unobserved components of the potential earnings 
functions are of special interest. If E[Ui |Z,W,D=i, i=1,0] > 0, where D is an indicator 
that takes the value 1 when training take place and 0 otherwise, we say that the selection 
is positive. The conditional expectations of the state specific residuals can be 
decomposed into two parts: 




ε Z W E D W Z U E − > = = | 1 , , |
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1
1           (5) 




ε Z W E D W Z U E − < = = | 0 , , |
2
0
0           (6) 
with σ1ε  = σ
2
1 - σ10 - σ1c and σ0ε = σ01 - σ
2
0 - σ0c. The expectations on the right hand 
sides of (5) and (6) have fixed signs. In (5) the expectation is always positive and in (6) 
it is always negative.
2 With that in mind, it is the covariances that determine the signs of 
the conditional expectations on the left. The signs cannot be determined from the 
theoretical model and become therefore an empirical question. The sizes and signs of 
σ1ε, σ0ε, and σ10 discussed above identify three different structures (Willis, 1986). 
We consider the case where the unobserved cost component is irrelevant or 
uncorrelated with the state skills (σ1c = σ0c = 0).
3 The first structure is the positive 
hierarchical sorting characterized by σ
2
1 > σ10 > σ
2
0, which is equivalent with σ1ε > 0 
and σ0ε > 0. Those who receive training are those who are drawn from the upper portion 
of the distribution of the potential earnings in state 1, while those who do not enter 
training are those who are drawn from the lower portion of the distribution of the 
potential earnings in state 0. In this state we have a positive selection into training and 
negative selection into non-training.  
The second structure is the negative hierarchical sorting characterized by σ
2
1 < σ10 < 
σ
2
0 which corresponds to σ1ε < 0 and σ0ε < 0. This is the opposite case of the previous 
structure. Negative hierarchical sorting is usually of little empirical importance. 
The third structure is the non-hierarchical sorting which occurs when σ
2
1 > σ10 and 
σ
2
0 > σ10, which corresponds to σ1ε > 0 and σ0ε < 0. In this structure the sign of σ10 can 
                                                 
2 This is true only when the selection equation has a residual with a positive sign. When a negative sign is 
attached to the residual the signs of the conditional expectations switch (ie.D*=Zγ + ε vs.  D*=Zγ - ε) 
3 In the empirical analysis we impose the same assumption in order to simplify the estimation. Hence the 
discussion is directly linked to the model that is estimated.    9
be either positive or negative. The signs of the covariances between state and selection 
imply a positive selection into both training and non-training. In general, this case 
applies when σ10 is sufficiently small or if the scopes of the state-specific skills are 
about the same. The structure indicates that a person who enters state 1 would have had 
a higher reward in doing so as opposed to the alternative, while those who enter state 0 
would be better off there as opposed to the alternative. This implies that the selection 
makes the groups above average in their state specific outcome distribution.
4 In general 
the non-hierarchical sorting implies that there is more than one distinct ability factor and 
that the direction of the ability bias is uncertain (Willis, 1986).  
 
3 The empirical model specification  
Most of the empirical literature on evaluating governmental training programs focuses 
on mean effects and, in particular, on the mean direct effect of treatment on those who 
receive training [Heckman et al. (1998)]. In this paper we use the standard index 
sufficient method of the prototypical selection model formulated by Björklund and 
Moffitt (1987) so that the individual reward from training can be identified, and allowed 
to be unique for each individual [Heckman et. al. (1985,1986)]. This approach to the 
selection problem allows for selection on unobservables, which is an important 
motivation for the choice of estimator since selection into training to a large extent is 
determined by the ambition of the unemployed.
5 Ambition is usually something that is 
unobserved and finding a good instrument for it would require unique data that is not at 
hand. 
                                                 
4 The state specific outcome distributions are hypothetical income distributions from which the treated 
and untreated take their income. The hypothetical distributions do not pertain only to those in the analysis 
but are complete and dense distributions. It is therefore the case that the analysed group does not 
completely cover its state specific income distribution but only a part of it. In the case of positive 
selection the group is therefore located on the right upper part of the distribution.  
5 Eriksson (1997) carried out an informal telephone interview with Swedish officials and found that in the 
contact between the administrator and unemployed individuals, ambition and motivation of the 
unemployed were important for recruitment to a training program. Åtgärdsundersökning (1998, AMV) 
interviewed individuals who participated in a program in 1997. This survey showed that 60% of the 
participants took the initiative to participate in the training program. The unemployed person has the 
possibility to inform himself about different courses and programs from ring binders, billboards, and 
computer terminals available at the employment office. The participant’s own involvement in seeking 
information has played the most important role in the recruitment of participants to programs. The 
administrator’s role is more important for foreign-born (non-Nordic) in their decision to participate. 
   10
If we adopt the separability assumption mentioned earlier with a linear restriction in 
the parameters we may form the observed Y: 
 
  Y = DY1 + (1 – D)Y0            (7) 
By inserting (1) into (7) we obtain: 
 
Y = Xβ0 +D[X(β1 – β0) + (U1 – U0)] + U0          (8) 
This gives us the two regimes switching regression model (Quandt, 1972). The term 
multiplying D is the gain from the program and D is the observed binary analogue of 
the latent continuous variable D*. The gain has two components. The first component, 
X(β1-β0), is the gain from the average person with characteristics X in the population. 
This term is the so-called experimental treatment average, and would be the treatment 
effect in case of a social experiment (i.e. if the selection to training would have been 
random) [(Heckman et. al 1996), (Heckman, 1990)]. Typically this parameter is of 
limited interest in policy analysis since it constitutes the average gain for a person taken 
randomly from the population, which is a group that doesn’t coincide with the target 
population of labor market programs. The second component, U1-U0, is the idiosyncratic 
gain for a particular person. This component will be zero if agents do not know their 
gain or do not act on it. The best forecast would then be zero and no additional effect 
due to self-selection would be present. This two-component effect is non-standard in 
conventional econometrics since it combines the “structural” effect, X(β1-β0), with a 
stochastic effect (i.e. the change in the unobservables, U1 – U0). With this set-up we can 
construct three parameters that usually are estimated in the literature. The effect of the 
treatment on the treated (9), the effect of the treatment on the non-treated (10) and the 
average treatment effect (11) respectively: 
 
    E[Y1 – Y0 | X, D = 1] = X(β1 – β0) + E[U1 – U0 | X, D = 1]      (9) 
E[Y1 – Y0 | X, D = 0] = X(β1 – β0) + E[U1 – U0 | X, D = 0]      (10) 
E[Y1 – Y0 | X] = X(β1 – β0) + E[U1 – U0 | X]        (11) 
 
All three estimators give the same results when E[U1 – U0 | X, D ] = E[U1 – U0 | X] = 
0. This can happen only if U1 = U0 or if agents either do not know U1-U0 or do not act   11
on it. If they are the same it means that a change in one state will result in the exact 
same change for the individual in the other state. This implies that when we condition 
the difference on X, everyone with the same X has exactly the same treatment effect. 
We think this is an unnecessary restrictive assumption and therefore allow for 
idiosyncratic gain in the model. 
 
3.1 The random coefficient model  
In order to account for the unobserved heterogeneity, one needs to make a distributional 
assumption for the idiosyncratic gain. If no such assumption is made, the individual 
gain will not be identified and only the mean sum of the two components could be 
estimated. We separate the reward from training from the cost of training. The selection 
rule then says that when the reward exceeds the cost, the individual chooses to 
participate in training. Formally we may express the model in the following way: 
 
Y = Xβ + α + u  when D = 1          (12) 
Y = Xβ +        u  when D = 0 
 
Reward:  α = Zγ + ε             (13) 
Cost:  C = Wδ             (14) 






= α− > 
=  = α− < 
        (15) 
 
Each state is allowed to have its own error term with a separate variance, and free 
correlation between the choice equation and the two states. In the training state the 
unobserved component ( U1 ) is represented by u + ε, while in the non-training state the 
unobserved component ( U0 ) is represented by u alone. We do not allow for any 
unobserved heterogeneity with respect to cost, primarily to decrease the complexity of 
the model, but also since our focus is on the heterogeneity to rewards.
6 In this paper we 
will estimate a random coefficient model using maximum likelihood technique. The 
problem is therefore to define the contribution to the likelihood for each individual.   12
Since the data is bivariate in nature, we start by making use of two marginal bivariate 
density functions, f(U1, ε) and f(U0, ε), using one density for each state. The likelihood 
function for this model is therefore: 
D Z W D
Z W
D Z W D
Z W
d u f u f d u f u f
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Since U1 = u + ε and U0 = u the two marginal densities contain only two unique 
stochastic components which makes it possible limit the distributional assumption to 
one bivariate density. The two behavioral components used in the estimation have the 































ε ε    (17) 
 
With this assumption it is possible to derive the components to be used in the likelihood 






ε. Few identifying restrictions have been 
applied. One important restriction is the parameters in the reward equation. In order to 
identify the variance of the reward (σ
2
ε) we have normalized γ = 1, in the selection 
equation (i.e. in f(ε|u) and f(ε|u+ε) ) while allowing it to be unrestricted in the wage 
equation (i.e. in f(u) and f(u+ε) ).
7 This works if we have at least one variable in Z that is 
not in W. This model does not formally require an exclusion restriction (instrument) 
between the selection equation and the earnings equation. That the exclusion restriction 
can be useful in any case is shown by Monte Carlo studies finding that the estimator 
performs poorly when exclusion restrictions are not imposed.
8  No other restrictions 
                                                                                                                                               
6 Björklund and Moffitt (1987) estimate this model allowing for unobserved heterogeneity with respect to 
cost as well. When they tested if this contributed to the model they received insignificant test results 
indicating that the unobserved cost components were of minor importance in their case. 
7 See Björklund and Moffitt (1987). The technique is replicated from their study. 
8 It is important, however, that the instrument that constitutes the exclusion restriction is good in the sense 
that it is correlated with the selection process but uncorrelated with the outcome variable. It can be hard to 
find good instruments unless one specially designs a survey for this purpose.   13
have been applied. The treatment on the treated and the corresponding variance is 
therefore defined as: 
 
[] ( ) ε ε σ γ δ λ σ γ δ γ α / ) ( , , 1 | Z W Z W Z D E − + = =         ( 1 8 )  
[] () () [ ] [] ε ε ε ε σ γ δ σ γ δ λ σ γ δ λ σ δ γ α / ) ( / ) ( / ) ( 1 , , 1 | 2 Z W Z W Z W W Z D V − − − − − = =  
 
with λ(.) being the inverse of Mills ratio.
9 The variable specifications pertaining to the 
different equations are important. The variables explaining the outcome equation are 
standard, namely age, gender and education. The ambition has been to have the 
specification as parsimonious as possible yet including what is relevant, and accessible. 
The reward to training is explained by the same observed factors as in the outcome 
equation. We find no reason to include anything there that was not in the earnings 
equation. The cost equation is more complicated. It should include non-earnings related 
factors such as preferences and foregone income etc, which are not included in our data 
set. It could be argued that ability to learn decreases by age and therefore induces 
negative preferences for training. Preference towards training might also differ by 
gender, in the sense that women and men respond differently to training. Distance to the 
training center is another factor that might induce a cost. Living in a big city region 
might create the feeling of being closer to the training center, compared to living outside 
the city.  
Heckman et al (1999) argue that this model emphasizes changes in the opportunity 
costs, i.e., foregone earnings, as the major determinant of participation in training 
programs. They show evidence that suggests that changes in labor force status predict 
participation in programs. We therefore include number of days of unemployment the 
year before training as a factor. The variables used as exclusion restrictions 
(instruments) are big-city region and previous unemployment. Intuitively we feel that 
living in a big city region is correlated with the selection process while the correlation 
with the outcome variable is unclear. When looking at the descriptive statistics we see 
that the proportion living in big city region is larger for those participating in a training 
program compared to those who do not, which implies that it is more likely that such a 
                                                 
9 See Maddala (1983) and Greene (1993) for further information about the mean and variance of the 
normal truncated distributions.    14
person goes to training. In the same way we are convinced that the earlier 
unemployment situation is correlated with the selection process, and we have evidence 
mentioned above that such is the case in the US.  In the data section it will be apparent 
that we have a pre-training dip in earnings in our sample, which therefore further 
confirms the relevance of the variable in our case. When looking at correlation measures 
among the variables for participation, living in big city region and earlier 
unemployment, we find significant correlation coefficients. When, on the other hand, 
we look at the correlations between the earnings variables and the instruments we find 
insignificant correlation coefficients. This situation holds true over time as well. 
The foreign-born group has an extended variable specification in both the earnings 
and the reward equation. Country of origin and number of years in Sweden play an 
important role in the determination of the individual’s success in the labor market and 
therefore also on the reward and earnings of participating in a training program. We 
have therefore included such variables to control for any observed differences related to 
these factors.  
 
4 Data 
We have access to a register database (SWIP) that constitutes a stratified random 
sample of the population living in Sweden.
10 It is stratified into two parts: the first is a 
1% sample of the Swedish-born population and the second is a 10% sample of the 
foreign-born population. The stratified random sample was drawn by Statistics Sweden 
using population files from 1978. The individuals drawn at that initial year were 
followed over time with repeated yearly cross-sections. To each consecutive year a 
supplement of individuals were added to each cross-sectional unit to adjust for 
migration and newly born; the intention being to make each and every stratified cross-
section representative for the Swedish population with respect to each stratum. 
Descriptive statistics presented in Tables 1a and 1b show that the treatment groups 
for the 1984-85 cohorts consists of 490 natives and 982 foreign-born. This corresponds 
to a population in training programs in Sweden of 59,320 persons for these years.  The 
                                                 
10 The Swedish Income Panel (SWIP) is a register based panel data set administrated by Swedish Social 
Science Data Service (SSD). More information can be found at www.ssd.gu.se.   15
1987-88 and 1990-91 samples of trainees are of similar sizes and correspond to 
populations in training programs of 61,420 and 57,410, respectively. 
Tables 1-3 show that the gender composition among people in training programs is 
relatively even for all cohorts. Although there is a variation in age among the trainees, 
the majority (or nearly the majority) are in the interval 26 to 45 years with a mean of 
around 30 years for natives and slightly higher for foreign-born.  
In general the trainees and non-trainees have similar characteristics, but there are a 
few exceptions worth mentioning. The two first cohorts of the Swedish born trainees 
have on average higher education than the non-trainees while this difference changes in 
the third cohort where the groups have similar education levels. Hence, in the beginning 
of the 80s when the unemployment level were low, higher educated were selected (or 
self selected) into training to a lager extent compared to the beginning of the 90s when 
unemployment levels were increasing. This might be a sign of a policy change in the 
sense that instead of reeducating people with an existing education the focus in the 90s 
might been on further education for those with low education. Another difference that is 
more striking is that trainees on average have shorter earlier unemployment spells the 
year before training compared to the non-trainees. This indicates that those with shorter 
unemployment spells were selected into labor market training (by themselves or by the 
administrator). This difference remains the same for all three cohorts. Both education 
and pre-training unemployment spells are included in the model and therefore 
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Table 1a Descriptive statistics for the 1984/85 Swedish-born cohort 
 
Trainees Non-trainees   
Men Women Men Women 
Observations 
Age (mean) 
   20-25(%) 
   26-45(%) 
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Married (%) 
Children 0-6 year (%) 
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Table 1b Descriptive statistics for the 1984/85 foreign-born cohort 
 
Trainees Non-trainees   
Men Women Men Women 
Observations 
Age (mean) 
   20-25(%) 
   26-45(%) 
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Number of years in the country (%) 
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   Eastern Europe 
   Southern Europe 
   Middle East 

































   17
Table 2a Descriptive statistics for the 1987/88 Swedish-born cohort 
 
Trainees Non-trainees   
Men Women Men Women 
Observations 
Age (mean) 
   20-25 (%) 
   26-45 (%) 





















Region (Big city) (%) 
Married (%) 
Children 0-6 year (%) 


















   Primary 
   Secondary 
   Post secondary 
























Table 2b Descriptive statistics for the1987/88 foreign-born cohort 
 
Trainees Non-trainees   
Men Women Men Women 
Observations 
Age (mean) (%) 
   20-25 (%) 
   26-45 (%) 
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Table 3a Descriptive statistics for the 1990/91 Swedish-born cohort 
 
Trainees Non-trainees   
Men Women Men Women 
Observations 
Age (mean) 
    20-25 (%) 
    26-45 (%) 





















Region (city) (%) 
Married (%) 
Children 0-6 year (%) 
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Table 3b Descriptive statistics for the 1990/91 foreign born cohort 
 
Trainees Non-trainees   
Men Women Men Women 
Observations 
Age (mean) 
    20-25 (%) 
    26-45 (%) 
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The foreign-born trainees and their comparison groups are more concentrated to the 
larger cities than their native counterparts. Few trainees have post-secondary education. 
Looking at immigrant specific variables, it can be seen that about half of the foreign-
born trainees in the two first cohorts have lived in Sweden for more than a decade, 
while many foreign-born trainees in the third cohort are recent arrivals. Across the 
cohorts of foreign born there is also a shift in region of birth. People born in other 
Nordic countries make up a considerable proportion of the trainees in the first cohort 
while a large portion of people born in countries outside Europe makes up the last 
cohort of trainees. 
Earnings is our outcome variable, and it consists of incomes from employment and 
self-employment and is measured on an annual basis. This means that our outcome 
variable captures wage effects of training as well as effects from number of hours 
worked. We follow trainees and their counterfactuals during a period of three years 
before training until three years after training. 
Figure 1 shows for all cohorts, natives and foreign-born, how mean earnings have 
developed for trainees as well as for the comparison group. With the exception of the 
period of training, the curves for the treatment group and the comparison group rise 
until the beginning of the 90s after which they decrease. This reflects the general 
development of real earnings in the Swedish economy during the period under study. 
The curves for the native trainees and non-trainees start at approximately the same 
level. The curves for trainees then decrease during the period of training, and after the 
completion of the training period return to approximately the same level as for the non-
trainees. This makes us suspect that the average training reward for natives cannot be 
large. Turning to foreign-born the situation is somewhat different. Trainees have 
considerably lower earnings than non-trainees before training, and reach approximately 
the same level after training. This makes us suspect that the average reward for foreign-
born trainees is positive. Figure 1 also indicates the presence of Ashenfelter’s dip in the 
pre-training earnings (Ashenfelter, 1978), which therefore leads us to believe that 
employment status before training could work as an indicator for selection into training. 
The exception is the third cohort of the foreign-born people who do not dip (or started 
their dip earlier, before the observation window. This situation is partly explained by the   20
large number of newly arrived immigrants that apparently had little or no earnings 
before training.  
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Figure 1 Earnings development over time and cohorts (earnings are deflated using 1999 
as base year and given in thousands of SEK)   21
4.1 The treatment group 
As mentioned above, we analyze three different cohorts of trainees, and the first cohort 
was drawn from the 1984 and 1985 cross-sections of SWIP. To be able to include 
trainees taking courses longer than a year or courses that start one year and ends the 
second year, it was necessary to sample trainees from a two-year cross-sectional 
window and then merge the two cross-sectional samples into one. The sample of 
trainees for each cohort can therefore be classified into three groups. The first group 
consists of people who participated in a program the first year only, the second group of 
individuals who participated in a program the second year only, and the third group of 
individuals who participated in a program that started the first year and ended the 
second year. These individuals were controlled not to have participated in any labor-
market training program three years before and three years after the two-year cross-
sectional window, which we refer to as the training period.
11 The two following cohorts 
were drawn in exactly same way but from different cross-sectional years namely, 
1987/88 and 1990/91. 
The critical question when using population files is how to identify the trainees. 
From the files we have information about how large of a training grant an individual 
received for a given year. Training grants therefore function as a flag variable, 
indicating whether or not a person took part in training that particular year. Since this is 
our only way of identifying trainees, we have no information as to whether the trainee 
actually completed the program. Dropouts might therefore be a source of bias in the 
estimates of the training effects. In order to reduce the training cohort from individuals 
who dropped out immediately or at the beginning of the program, we decided to 
truncate the sample with respect to the amount of training grant an individual received. 
We thought that a training grant corresponding to a four-week period would work as a 
lower truncation point.
12 Since the official rules prescribe that only individuals aged 20 
or older may participate in a program, we set the lower age limit to 20 and an upper 
arbitrary level at 55. The first cohort had no one older then 55 years of age, which 
                                                 
11 When constructing the treatment group the idea is to have a group that participate in one program 
during a specific time period, and that no training have taken place or will take place during the follow up 
period. This is important when the ambition is to measure the income effect from one program.  
12 The truncation of the training grant reduced the number of trainees in each cohort with 4-7%.   22
therefore made us choose that upper age limit for all three cohorts. There are exceptions 
to the lower age limit, but we disregard them in this paper. 
A problem with our flag-variable is that it contains two sorts of individuals. It 
includes individuals from labor market training programs but also individuals who have 
been participating in programs administrated by the Labor Market Institute (AMI). AMI 
is not a training program but individuals enrolled in AMI received the same kind of 
allowance, and since we identify the individuals from the grant received, we are not able 
to separate them. Fortunately, AMI individuals only comprise around 13% of the 
sample and the proportion stays constant during the observation window. The average 
schooling time for AMI participants is around 2-3 months, while a training program 
lasts on average around 5-6 months. This means that we reduced the AMI part 
proportionally more then the trainee part of the sample with the lower truncation point.  
 
4.2 The comparison group 
The main idea is to construct a group that is comparable to the treatment group with 
respect to the characteristics of the trainees. A natural group to consider is that of 
individuals who were unemployed during the training period but who did not participate 
in any training program. When constructing the comparison groups for the three cohorts 
we use the same observation window as for the trainees. For the first cohort we take 
unemployed individuals from 1984 and 1985 cross-sectional years and pool them 
together to one set of non-trainees. 1987/88 and 1990/91 cross-sectional years were 
used in the same way for the other two cohorts. 
Our dataset offers information about how much unemployment insurance (UI and/or 
CA) a person received in a given year, and this therefore works as an unemployment 
indicator when we select individuals into the set of non-trainees for the three cohorts. 
Individuals participating in training usually have had a period of unemployment before 
a program may be an option. It is therefore important to have individuals with some 
length of unemployment in the non-treatment group. From a recent study by Okeke 
(2001) we know that the average waiting time before starting a training program is 3 
months. This implies that around 50% of all participants have been unemployed a   23
period shorter then 3 months.
13 By imposing a lower truncation point for the non-
trainees we will be able to move the average unemployment duration forward and 
thereby construct a group that looks more like the trainees with respect to this point. We 
decided that one month would be an accurate number for this purpose and deleted 
individuals with less then one month of unemployment.
14   
 
Table 4 Compensation levels in SEK per day
 15 
Benefit 1984  1987  1990 








Cash Assistance  185  240  297 





Days per year number of weeks per year




To estimate the duration of unemployment for an individual who was entitled to 
unemployment insurance, we divided the total amount of unemployment insurance a 
person received a given year with the daily average unemployment insurance 
individuals in general received that particular year (see Table 4). That gives us an 
estimate of how many days that particular individual was unemployed that year. 
Dividing that number with the average number of days per month an individual could 
be compensated (21.75), we receive an approximation of the number of months an 
individual has been unemployed. If the individual was only entitled to cash assistance 
we divided by that figure instead. Furthermore we checked that the individuals did not 
participate in any training programs three years before and three years after the training 
period. The idea behind this was to control that none among the non-treated in fact were 
treated by a program in an earlier time period or participated in a program during the 
follow-up period when evaluating the treatment effects. This control was imposed on 
both the treaded and the non-treated, which therefore harmonizes the comparison. We 
applied the same age interval as for the trainees, i.e. only individuals aged 20-55. 
                                                 
13 If the distribution of waiting times is skewed to the left a smaller proportion of trainees starts earlier 
then 3 months.  
14 When using a lower truncation point of 1 month around 23% of the individuals in the original sample 
were lost. If a truncation point of 2 months were used around 40% were lost.   
15 Represents the average compensation amount that particular year. The unemployment insurance covers 
80% of the previous income but only up to a maximum level. The maximum level is given within 
parentheses. Cash assistance is paid by a fixed amount. Compensation is paid 5 days per week.    24
 
5 Results  
The estimates of the random coefficient model showing the treatment effect on earnings 
one year after the training are reported in Tables 5 and 6. Some comments can be made. 
Starting with the earnings equation, there is hardly a pattern of coefficients being large 
and estimated with small standard errors in any of the six samples. However, being 
male not surprisingly is associated with larger earnings among natives in the first two 
cohorts, and college education appears to yield substantially higher earnings in the third 
cohort for natives as well as foreign-born. One can also observe among immigrants that 
certain effects of origin are significant. For example in all cases, coefficients for 
variables measuring origin from the Middle East and "the rest of the world", 
respectively, (not in another Nordic country) are negative and estimated with a 
relatively small standard error. In general the estimates for education are small or 
insignificant except for the last cohort where the estimates are large and significant. We 
know from the descriptive statistics that the educational level of the trainees on average 
was higher then for the non-trainees in the first two cohorts. In the last cohort that 
difference switched and the non-trainees became somewhat higher educated compared 
to the trainees. We also know that during the period studied the importance of having a 
college degree for getting a job increased, relative to having a high school degree. One 
reason for the large college effect might therefore be that individuals with this level of 
education received jobs to a larger extent.  
Looking at the estimates of the reward equation, it can be noted that in many cases 
belonging to the youngest category (20-25) – the reference category – is associated with 
lower rewards than belonging to any other age category. In most cases the coefficient 
for the gender variable is not significant, the third cohort natives being an exception. 
There is a pattern of education higher than primary school leading to larger rewards in 
most cases. Looking at variables specific to foreign-born, there is a pattern of a 
residency period longer than five years leading to larger rewards than a shorter 
residency. Further, rewards for originating from a country other than a Nordic country – 
the reference area – are generally positive and estimated with a relatively small standard 
error.   25
Table 5 Model estimates for the random coefficient model one year after training
16 
Swedish-born Foreign-born   













































































































































































































































































































































Note: * significant at the 5% level. Standard errors are reported within parentheses 
                                                 
16 The table presents the estimates for the first year after training for each cohort. The estimates for the 
consecutive years (i.e., the second and the third years) can be found Tables A1 and A2a-b in Appendix. 
17 L-L No Cost and L-L No Reward represent the log likelihood function value when estimating the 
model excluding observed heterogeneity in the cost and reward equation (except for a constant). The 
critical value at the 5% significance level for a Chi-Squared(5) distribution is 11.07.     26
Table 6 Model estimate for random coefficient model one year after the training – 
extended variable specification for foreign-born
18 
 
Cohort 1  Cohort 2  Cohort 3   
Variables  Parameter  Standard err. Parameter  Standard err. Parameter  Standard err.
Years in Sweden                                              Earnings 


















































Years in Sweden                                                 Reward 


















































Note: 0-5 years represents the reference category for years in Sweden, and Nordic countries represent the 
reference group for the origin.  
 
 
In the cost equation the estimated age coefficients generally imply that costs increase 
with age, but at a decreasing pace. The cost for a male relative to a female is always 
positive. With only one exception, the coefficient indicating the number of days in 
unemployment the year before training is positive and large in relation to its standard 
error. This is opposite of what we would expect, since it is more reasonable to think that 
a longer unemployment period would increase the probability of going into a program. 
What we see here might be an indication of “cream-skimming” in the sense that those 
most likely to receive an employment after the training were selected into the program. 
In the descriptive statistics we see that over all cohorts the number of days of 
unemployment the year before training is shorter for the trainees than it is for the non-
trainees. The sign of the coefficient for the number of days of unemployment mirrors 
                                                 
18 When estimating the models with the foreign-born we extend the variable specification in the earnings 
and the reward equation, because we believe that time in the country and place of origin are important 
determinants in the selection effect as well as in the outcome equation. The estimates belong to the results 
in Table 5 and are separated only to simplify the presentation.  
   27
this fact and supports the cream-skimming hypothesis to the extent that the probability 
of employment is decreasing in the duration of unemployment..  
The two variables representing the exclusion restrictions (city region and days of 
unemployment last year) have different effects on the selection process. Living in a city 
region representing the distance to the training center has no effect during good 
economic climates, while it has some effect during a recession for the foreign-born 
people in the third cohort. 
The third cohort is somewhat different in structure compared to the other cohorts 
since Sweden was faced with a wave of immigrants that to some extent became a target 
population for the labor market programs, since the immigrants’ situation on the labor 
market was difficult. Groups of people among the foreign-born participated in programs 
that were of preparatory nature, such as language courses, and most often the groups 
were clustered in city regions. That might be one reason for the positive and significant 
effect of the city region indicator received for the third cohort. The second identifying 
variable, the number of days of unemployment the year before treatment, is significant 
over the cohorts and groups.
19 The Swedish-born in the third cohort are an exception.  
At the bottom of Table 5 we present the log-likelihood values for specifications 
where observed heterogeneity with respect to cost and reward are disregarded and set to 
zero (except for a constant), one at a time. We observe that a likelihood ratio test would 
reject the null hypothesis (on a 5% significance level) that the observed cost or observed 
reward heterogeneity had no influence on the model. That is a justification for the 
statement that heterogeneity in rewards is important to control for. For the foreign-born 
group it is even more important, since they are more heterogeneous then the Swedish-
born group. 
The central interest of this study is on treatment-effects using earnings as the 
outcome variable; these are reported in Table 7 as well as illustrated in Figure 2. There 
are several findings to comment on. We have positive rewards for a majority (or nearly 
a majority) of the treated between the first two cohorts, as well as in some cases for the 
third cohort. Comparing results cross cohorts we find that foreign-born in the third 
                                                 
19 Number of days of unemployment the year before training is based on the amount of unemployment 
compensation (UI or CA) an individual received the year before training. Hence, the variable is an 
estimate that is based on what an average individual received in compensation per day, which therefore 
might be exposed to some bias.   28
cohort as measured shortly after training, clearly stand out. Only a small proportion of 
the treated have positive treatment effects one and two years after completed training. 
However, the proportion was slightly over 50% three years after completed training.
20 
The results thus clearly suggest that a deteriorating labor market worsens the prospects 
for trainees. This comes as no surprise and has been shown in administrative follow-up 
studies (See Ds 2000:38, p 195). However, our results indicate that such an effect is 
limited to foreign-born trainees and to the first two years after training. 
 
Table 7a Treatment on the treated effects for 1984/85-year cohort (standard errors in 
parentheses) 
Year Mean  effect/Swedish  P(Y1-Y0>0) Mean  effect/foreign  P(Y1-Y0>0) 
1986  -0.027 
(0.049)  38  0.069 
(0.052)  57 
1987  0.101* 
(0.046)  74  0.262* 
(0.048)  83 
1988  0.005 
(0.048)  51  0.176* 
(0.047)  66 
 Note: * significant at the 5% level.  
 
Table 7b Treatment on the treated effects for 1987/88-year cohort (standard errors in 
parentheses) 
Year Mean  effect/Swedish  P(Y1-Y0>0) Mean effect/foreign  P(Y1-Y0>0) 
1989  0.084* 
(0.041)   68  0.062 
(0.049) 
 
  58 
1990  0.035 
(0.039)   56  0.194* 
(0.047)   82 
1991  0.129* 
(0.040)   80  0.323* 
(0.050)   93 
Note: * significant at the 5% level.  
 
Table 7c Treatment on the treated effects for 1990/91-year cohort (standard errors in 
parentheses) 
Year Mean  effect/Swedish  P(Y1-Y0>0) Mean effect/foreign  P(Y1-Y0>0) 
1992  0.016 
(0.083)   57  -0.485* 
(0.080)   18 
1993  -0.003 
(0.087)   50  -0.472* 
(0.081)   6 
1994  -0.087 
(0.085)   39  0.031 
(0.078)   59 
Note: * significant at the 5% level.  
 
                                                 
20 P(Y1-Y0>0) given in Table 7, denotes the share of trainees with positive reward. The reward is 
calculated for each trainee, using equation 18. Those with a positive value as a fraction of the total 
number of trainees in the sample generate the numbers in the table.   29
The structure and composition of the foreign-born group changes dramatically during 
the beginning of the 90’s. Sweden received a large group of immigrants that did not 
speak Swedish. The labor market programs offer two kinds of courses. The first is of a 
preparatory nature and the second is of a vocational nature. The relation between the 
two changes over time due to an increasing number of foreigners taking language 
courses or other courses of preparatory nature. In 1991 around 60% of the foreign-born 
trainees were in non-vocational courses not designed to increase the probability of 
employment but rather, to prepare for further training (Regnér, 1997). This obviously 
has some effect on the reward to training since the control group consists of 
unemployed individuals not taking part in training and, therefore, available to 
participate in labor market activities. We believe that is the major cause of the 
discrepancy between trainees and non-trainees for the foreign-born group in the third 
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  a) Swedish-born trainees    b) Foreign-born trainees 




                                                 
21 Box-plot explanation: the line in the middle of the box represents the median or 50
th percentile of the 
data. The box extends from the 25
th percentile to the 75
th percentile, the so-called interquartile range. The 
lines emerging from the box extend to the upper and lower adjacent values which is defined as plus minus 
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Figure 2c Reward dispersion for 1990/1991-year cohort on log earnings 
 
 
As was conjectured from inspecting Figure 1, the estimated mean effect of training 
for foreign-born belonging to the first two cohorts is positive and in most cases larger 
than for natives.  
Table 8 presents a way to identify the characteristics of the individuals that are 
located on the lower and upper part of the reward distribution. For each cohort we 
determine the full distribution of the rewards generated by equation (18). Having done 
that, we truncated the distribution at the lower 25
th percentile and the upper 75
th 
percentile. For each of these two parts of the distribution we the compare the 
proportions of individuals with different kinds of characteristics. 
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Table 8a Characteristics for the lower 25
th percentile and upper 75
th percentile of the 
reward distribution, for the 1984/1985-year cohort over the observation period for 
Swedish-born participants 
 
1986 1987 1988   
Variables  25th   75th  25th  75th  25th  75th 
Age  groups  (%)         
    20-25  50.8  13.0  56.0  15.3  28.7  32.3 
    26-45  49.2  43.1  43.2  52.4  71.3  37.9 
    46-55  0.0  43.9  0.8  32.3  0.0  29.8 
Education  (%)         
     Primary   79.2  22.0  64.8  16.1  86.9  6.5 
     Secondary   16.7  67.5  33.6  62.1  13.1  49.2 
     Post Secondary  4.2  10.6  1.6  21.8  0.0  44.4 
Gender (male) (%)  43.3  42.3  17.6  69.3  36.1  52.4 
Married (%)  15.0  44.7  21.6  34.7  28.7  34.6 
Number of children age 0-6 (%) 20.8  8.9  26.4  8.1  25.4  14.5 
Number of children age 7-12(%)  11.7  11.4  13.6  12.1  18.9  12.1 
Unemployed last year (%)  10.1  66.1  9.3  71.3  9.2  65.2 
Number of days in training (days)  99.4 101.2 103.9  102.4 108.5 108.1 
 
 
Table 8b Characteristics for the lower 25
th percentile and upper 75
th percentile of the 
reward distribution, for the 1984/1985-year cohort over the observation period for 
foreign-born participants 
 
1986 1987 1988   
Variables  25th 75th 25
th 75th 25th 75th 
Age  groups  (%)        
     20-25  47.8  7.8  48.8  7.8  22.9  19.1 
     26-45  45.7  77.0  41.1  79.6  68.6  65.0 
     46-55  6.5  15.2  10.2  12.7  8.6  15.6 
Education  (%)        
     Primary   88.2  15.2  79.2  22.9  90.6  11.0 
     Secondary   11.4  76.6  14.2  73.1  2.4  84.9 
     Post Secondary   0.4  8.2  6.5  4.1  6.9  4.1 
Gender  (male)  28.2 63.9 31.3 62.4 46.9 53.3 
Married  (%)  46.1 58.6 45.5 60.0 45.7 56.5 
Unemployed  last  year  (%)  3.9 60.7  2.88  63.1 1.7 59.5 
Number  of  days  in  training  124.3 142.9 119.1 146.5 132.5 149.7 
0-5 years in the country (%)  45.3  11.4  48.7  8.9  56.3  8.5 
6-10years  in  the  country  (%) 6.9 33.6 7.3 34.3 8.5 30.8 
More  then  10  years  (%)  47.7 54.9 43.9 56.7 35.1 60.5 
Nordic  country  (%)  54.7 20.9 55.7 18.7 54.3 17.8 
Northern  Europe  (%)  6.9 9.0 6.9 8.5 8.5  10.1 
Eastern  Europe  (%)  2.9 19.7 1.6 21.2 0.0 27.6 
Southern  Europe  (%)  4.1 22.1 2.4 26.1 4.9 19.9 
Middle  East  (%)  21.2 8.2 21.9 7.3 13.4  12.6 
Rest of the world (%)  10.2  20.1  11.4  17.9  18.7  11.7 
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Table 8c Characteristics for the lower 25
th percentile and upper 75
th percentile of the 
reward distribution, for the 1987/1988-year cohort over the observation period for 
Swedish-born participants 
 
1989   1990    1991   
Variables  25th 75th    25th  75th   25th 75th 
Age groups (%)                 
      20-25  13.3  79.2    24.0  70.9    38.2  48.1 
      26-45  71.8  17.7    66.7  21.3    53.9  37.9 
      46-55  14.8  3.1    9.3  7.6    7.8  13.9 
Education (%)                 
       Primary   19.5  34.6    22.5  26.7    44.5  12.4 
       Secondary   64.1  50.7    68.9  49.6    39.8  75.9 
       Post Secondary  16.4  14.6    8.5  23.6    15.6  11.6 
Gender (male) (%)  32.0  56.9    53.4  39.7    20.3  70.5 
Married (%)  27.3  10.7    20.2  15.3    20.3  21.7 
Number of children age 0-6 (%) 28.1 17.6   24.8  18.3   21.8 14.7 
Number of children age 7-12(%) 17.2  4.6   10.1  8.4   14.8  13.9 
Unemployed last year (%)  2.7  39.8    1.5  41.3    1.0  42.5 
Number of days in training (days)  146.5  114.2    131.7  136.7    121.9  129.7 
 
 
Table 8d Characteristics for the lower 25
th percentile and upper 75
th percentile of the 
reward distribution, for the 1987/1988-year cohort over the observation period for 
foreign-born participants 
 
1989 1990  1991   
Variables  25th 75th 25th  75th  25th  75
th 
Age groups (%) 













      26-45  65.4  65.8  57.9  70.9  58.9  67.5 
      46-55  7.1  20.8  9.6  16.5  10.4  17.1 
Education  (%)           
      Primary    72.5  15.8  61.6  13.2  71.3  5.0 
      Secondary    23.3  72.9  32.1  75.1  18.6  85.8 
      Post Secondary  4.2  11.3  6.3  11.6  9.9  9.2 
Gender (male) (%)  38.3  67.9  40.0  70.1  40.2  70.4 
Married (%)  40.0  47.5  35.8  49.7  34.0  48.7 
Number of children age 0-6  (%)  32.5  20.8  33.7  25.7  28.2  24.1 
Number of children age 7-12 (%)  18.3  20.4  16.6  22.4  19.5  23.7 
Percentage unemployed last year (%) 2.2  41.0  2.2  41.2  2.9  37.9 
Number of days in training (%)  115.6  158.2  122.6  153.2  115.8  175.8 
0 –5 years in the country (%)  47.9  11.6  47.1  12.0  24.8  30.0 
6-10years in the country (%)  14.2  27.1  12.9  29.8  20.7  23.7 
More then 10 years (%)  37.9  61.2  40.0  58.1  54.3  46.2 
Nordic country (%)  55.8  11.6  57.9  11.6  65.5  10.0 
Northern  Europe  (%)  9.2 2.9 2.5  10.7  4.1  6.7 
Eastern Europe (%)  6.3  20.8  6.5  19.5  10.4  14.5 
Southern  Europe  (%)  1.3 24.2 2.9  17.8  2.9  17.1 
Middle East (%)  13.7  20.8  9.5  25.3  6.2  31.6 
Rest of the world (%)  13.7  19.6  20.8  14.9  10.7  20.0 
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Table 8e Characteristics for the lower 25
th percentile and upper 75
th percentile of the 
reward distribution, for the 1990/1991-year cohort over the observation period for 
foreign-born participants 
 
1992 1993  1994   
25th 75th 25th 75th  25th  75th 
Age groups (%)             
     20-25  57.2  18.5  65.5  9.2  52.9  20.6 
     26-45  19.6  70.5  21.0  74.7  23.5  70.2 
     46-55  23.1  10.9  13.4  15.9  23.5  9.1 
Education (%)             
     Primary    82.1  0  57.1  2.5  70.5  0.8 
     Secondary    13.6  75.6  9.2  97.4  0.0  99.1 
     Post Secondary   4.3  24.3  33.6  0.0  29.4  0.0 
Gender (male) (%)  15.4  85.7  20.1  64.7  19.3  73.5 
Married (%)  30.7  33.6  20.1  35.3  27.7  31.4 
Number of children age 0-6 (%) 18.8 21.8 17.6  19.3 18.4  18.1 
Number of children age 7-12 (%) 9.4  14.2  6.7 19.3  6.7 15.7 
Percentage unemployed last year (%) 9.0  11.6  3.0  18.2  2.3  18.7 
Number of days in training (days) 107.7  132.1  115.7 124.3  120.1 126.6 
 
 
Table 8f Characteristics for the lower 25
th percentile and upper 75
th percentile of the 
reward distribution, for the 1984/1985-year cohort over the observation period for 
foreign-born participants 
 
1992 1993  1994   
25th 75th  25th  75th  25th  75th 
Age groups (%)             
     20-25  40.2  13.6  35.5  5.7  27.2  7.3 
     26-45  46.5  69.5 53.7 78.5  55.7  84.8 
     46-55  13.3  16.8  10.7  15.7  16.9  7.7 
Education (%)             
    Primary    80.1 6.9  61.9  27.6  51.6  34.8 
    Secondary    2.9  92.5  4.5  72.3  13.6  65.2 
    Post Secondary   17.0  0.4  33.4  0.0  34.7  0.0 
Gender (male) (%)  43.9  57.2  51.6  46.2  37.1  57.3 
Married (%)  36.5  61.3  42.1  61.9  42.1  64.3 
Number of children age 0-6 (%) 20.7  36.2 26.4 37.6  22.7  37.7 
Number of children age 7-12(%) 17.8  25.1 15.2 28.9 19.4 30.3 
Unemployed last year (%)  4.0  16.3  2.0  20.4  3.3  17.2 
Number of days in training (days) 128.8  157.2  157.1  140.3 136.7 159.7 
0-5 years in the country (%) 31.5  50.6  57.4  29.3  32.2  53.2 
6-10years in the country (%)  7.8  23.4  7.0  31.4  10.3  22.9 
More then 10 years (%)  60.5  25.9  35.5  39.2  57.4  23.7 
Nordic country (%)  59.7  5.3  47.9  4.9  69.4  0.0 
Northern Europe (%)  4.5  6.2  3.7  4.9  2.5  0.8 
Eastern Europe (%)  2.1  20.2  4.1  23.9  3.7  31.1 
Southern Europe (%)  12.0  7.8  2.5  10.3  4.1  1.6 
Middle East (%)  13.2  33.3  26.4  30.1  13.2  25.8 
Rest of the world (%)  8.3  27.2  15.3  25.6  7.0  40.5 
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In order to summarize the information we have also constructed Table 9. The idea for 
this table is to count the number of the six samples defined by cohort and country of 
origin where there are consistent indications of a low respectively high position in the 
reward distribution. There is also one column for indications of the position in the 
reward distribution being non-conclusive. When discussing the results we will start 
from the information in Table 9 and when motivated, also refer to those in Table 8.  
 
 
Table 9 Summary of results reported in Table 8 
 
Subgroup   Consistent indications of 
a low position in the 
reward distribution  
Not conclusive   Consistent indication of 
a high position in the 
reward distribution  
                                            Number of Indications 
Age of the person        
20-25 5  0  1 
26-45 1  2  3 
46-55 0  5  1 
Education of the person     
Primary   5  1  0 
Secondary 0  1  5 
Post secondary  2  3  1 
Male   0  0  6 
Married   0  2  4 
Variables specific to native-born     
Number of children 
aged 0-6  
1 2 0 
Number of children  
Aged 7-12 
0 3 0 
Variables specific to foreign-born     
0-5 years in the country  2  1  0 
6-10 years in the 
country 
0 1 2 
More than 10 years in 
the country  
1 0 2 
Originating from     
A Nordic country  3  0  0 
Northern Europe   0  3  0 
Eastern Europe  0  0  3 
Southern Europe  0  1  2 
Middle East  0  1  2 
Rest of the world   0  2  1 
Note: To be classified as having a consistently high (low) position it is required that the percentage in the 
75
th percentile differs from the one in the 25
th percentile by on average 10 percentage units per year and 
that a difference of at least 10 percentage units is observed for no less than two years. 
 
 
Starting with age, there are clear signs of the youngest persons being located in the 
low position of the reward distribution. The only exception to this is found among the   35
second cohort of Swedish-born; persons who terminated training when the labor market 
prospects became more favorable. There is much less structure as regards the location of 
the other two age groups. This finding can be understood from the background of 
relatively few trainees being found in the oldest age group. 
The conclusion that rewards for young trainees are generally low can also be backed 
by results from several Swedish studies referred to in the introduction. Ackum (1991) 
for example, who studied young adults that received training at approximately the same 
time as our first cohort, drew a very similar conclusion. In addition, results from two 
studies on persons who received training at approximately the same time as our third 
cohort are comparable. The studies are Regnér (1997) and Larsson (2000), the latter 
focusing on young adults. It is interesting to note that Friedlander et al (1997), when 
summarizing a number of evaluations of labor market training programs in the United 
States, drew similar conclusions. 
Turning to education, the pattern shows that a primary education also leads to a low 
position in the reward distribution, while the opposite is the case for secondary 
education. There is not much of a pattern across the samples when it comes to the 
position of post-secondary education in the reward distribution. These findings lead to 
the unanswered question: What can explain why the pay-off from labor market training 
is higher for those with secondary education, while low for those with only primary 
education? 
According to the findings summarized in Table 9, there is a general pattern of males 
having a higher position in the reward distribution than females. There is also a pattern, 
although not equally striking, that married trainees have a higher position in the reward 
distribution than other trainees. The result mentioned first can be regarded as a 
controversial finding as it is in conflict with what Regnér (1997) reports for 
approximately our third cohort. 
Finally we comment on variables specific for foreign-born. First, it seems as there is 
more of a pattern between country of origin and position in the reward distribution, than 
between years since immigration and position in the reward distribution. People 
originating from other Nordic countries are generally found in the lower position of the 
reward distribution, while people from other parts of the world are under-represented at   36
the bottom of the reward distribution. The results for people originating from Eastern 
Europe are consistently found in the top of the reward distribution for all three cohorts. 
Table 10 presents another way to examine how rewards vary with characteristics one 
year after completed training. For natives and foreign-born people of a given gender, we 
present means and medians the year after completed training, disaggregated by 
education and age, respectively. Looking at the information in the different cells, the 
most striking information is that large negative values for foreign-born in the 1990/91 
cohort appear in most cells. One can also notice that among natives in the last two 
cohorts, the values for males are generally higher than for females.  
 
 
Table 10a Heterogeneity to reward, treatment on the treated for 1984/85-year cohort 
(standard error in parentheses) 
 
1986  Primary School  Secondary School  Post Secondary School 



















































  Age (20-25)  Age (26-45) Age  (46-55) 






























































   37
Table 10b Heterogeneity to reward, treatment on the treated for 1987/88-year cohort 
(standard error in parentheses) 
 
1989  Primary School  Secondary School  Post Secondary School 



















































  Age (20-25)  Age (26-45)  Age (45-55) 



















































Note: * significant at the 5% level.  
 
Table 10c Heterogeneity to reward, treatment on the treated for 1990/91-year cohort 
(standard errror in parentheses) 
 
1992  Primary School  Secondary School  Post Secondary School 
  Gender  Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 


















































  Age  (20-25) Age  (26-45) Age  (46-55) 
  Gender  Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 


















































Note: * significant at the 5% level. 
 
Earlier, Table 7a indicated that for the first cohort the overall average effect is 
insignificant for both Swedish- and foreign-born trainees. Table 10a confirms this for   38
different sub-groups. However, foreign-born males with a high-school degree, or in the 
age interval 26-45 have a positive and significant earnings effect from training. For the 
Swedish-born trainees no sub-group had any significant training effect on earnings.  
The second cohort provides a somewhat different picture for the Swedish-born: 
young people (20-25) are the main driving force behind the positive effect in Table 7b. 
With respect to the foreign-born the impression is about the same as it was for the first 
cohort, except for the fact that the age effect is insignificant for the second cohort.  
For the last cohort, none of the sub-groups among the Swedish-born trainees show 
estimates significant at conventional levels. For the foreign-born the situation is 
reversed, and many of the sub-groups show significant earnings effects, yet negative. 
In Table 11 the sorting components are presented for the cohorts and groups over the 
follow-up period. Two interesting components are σ1ε and σ0ε. Those two covariances 
give you the size and direction of the selection into the two states.  Since σ1ε >0 and 
σ0ε<0 we have positive selection into both training and non-training, implying that 
choices are rational in the sense that individuals are selected according to where they 
will perform best.  
In general, the pattern of the components over time is the same for foreign-born and 
Swedish-born people. The covariance between the two states (σ10) is an exception. For 
the foreign-born the sign is negative while it is positive for the Swedish-born. This is 
the case for all three cohorts and is therefore a difference that is independent of the 
economic climate. The absolute magnitude changes however, but this is the case for 
both groups. A positive sign indicates that an individual who performs well in one state 
also will perform well in the other state, and from the discussion above we know that 
the state is chosen where the reward is highest. For the foreign-born individuals the 
situation is different with a negative sign. That implies that if they do relatively well in 
one state they perform relatively poorly in the other state. This implies that the relative 
importance of the program for foreign-born people is greater than for Swedes. 
A test for the importance of the unobserved component of the reward would be a test 
of σ1ε = σ0ε Ù σε+u,u= σε,u . In the table we see that they even have different signs, 
indicating that controlling for unobserved heterogeneity with respect to the reward is 
important. Since we know that the individual’s ambition to participate in the program is   39
a major factor, we know that we do not have access to all relevant variables for the 
selection process. This makes it even more important to control for such factors.  
 
 
Table 11a Behavioral components for Swedish-born people (standard errors in 
parentheses) 
 
Cohort 1  Cohort 2  Cohort 3   
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 










0.352       0.403      0.373 
(0.015)    (0.016)   (0.015) 
1.640       1.543      1.601 
(0.142)   (0.156)    (0.167) 
-0.233      -0.251    -0.223 
(0.025)     (0.046)   (0.045) 
0.395       0.332       0.409 
(0.017)    (0.015)   (0.018) 
1.400        1.359       1.381 
(0.126)    (0.126)    (0.124) 
-0.324     -0.283       -0.328 
(0.039)    (0.037)    (0.041) 
0.641      0.835       0.724 
(0.038)    (0.040)   (0.041) 
3.093       3.336      3.249 
(0.432)    (0.348)   (0.347) 
-0.502     -0.653     -0.548 
(0.095)   (0.101)    (0.095) 






1.526      1.444       1.528 
1.407      1.292       1.377 
0.119       0.152      0.151 
1.147        1.124       1.134 
1.075        1.075       1.053 
0.071        0.049       0.081 
2.729       2.865      2.876 
2.591      2.683      2.700 
0.138      0.182       0.176 
 
 
Table 11b Behavioral components for foreign-born people (standard errors in 
parentheses) 
 
  Cohort 1    Cohort 2  Cohort 3   
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 










0.656      0.609      0.531 
(0.034)  (0.034)    (0.030) 
2.919      2.583       2.555 
(0.172)   (0.069)   (0.137) 
-0.714    -0.762     -0.687 
(0.069)   (0.063)   (0.058) 
0.531       0.594       0.759 
(0.027)     (0.033)   (0.040) 
2.594        2.505      2.672 
(0.155)     (0.150)   (0.168) 
-0.611     -0.677     -0.840 
(0.059)    (0.061)   (0.072) 
1.002       1.073       1.378 
(0.051)     (0.055)   (0.073) 
6.115        6.138      5.838 
(0.392)     (0.382)   (0.362) 
-1.306      -1.410   -1.779 
(0.127)     (0.131)  (0.142) 






2.147     1.667      1.711 
2.205     1.820      1.868 
-0.058    -0.153     -0.156 
1.902      1.745     1.751 
1.983      1.828     1.832 
-0.080     -0.082    -0.080 
4.505       4.391     3.658 
4.809       4.728     4.059 




6 Summary and conclusions  
In this paper we have evaluated labor market training programs in Sweden using non-
experimental methods. People who received training in 1984/85, 1987/88 and 1990/91 
as well as a control groups were followed using register data. The main outcome 
variable was earnings as evaluated one, two and three years after completed training.   40
Different samples for natives and foreign-born were investigated. We estimate a 
switching regression model while allowing for unobserved heterogeneity with respect to 
the reward on training. This allows us to investigate how the reward is distributed across 
observed characteristics and between individuals. 
A number of interesting findings were found and a number of conclusions can be 
drawn from the study. First, when analyzing treatment effects for trainees and controls, 
they were found to greatly differ for all cohorts investigated as well as across natives 
and foreign-born. The difference is found not only when analyzing earnings one year 
after completed training, but also two and three years after completed training. The 
differences all mean that there is positive sorting into training. 
Second, overall, the proportion having positive rewards from training as evaluated by 
earnings was not very different from the proportion having negative rewards. The 
estimates for average rewards from training were in some cases relatively large, but so 
were the standard errors for the estimate. These results are in line with what was found 
in earlier studies of training, studies that took place in Sweden during approximately the 
same period (Zetterberg, 1997). This means that the results from our study do not 
support the view, which suggests that from efficiency considerations, too few persons 
were enrolled in labor market training during this period. 
Third, comparing results cross cohorts it was found that rewards stand out for the 
third foreign-born cohort, as most rewards were negative during the first two years 
following training. However, this changed during the following year. We interpret these 
findings as being driven by rapidly deteriorating labor market conditions. Thus it seems 
as though rapid changes in the labor market can drastically affect rewards, but also that 
such an influence is concentrated to the foreign-born and vanishes over time. 
Fourth, when analyzing how rewards differ by characteristics across samples of the 
trainee, certain patterns were found. Consistent with several previous studies, we found 
that being a young adult means a negative or low pay-off from training. We also arrived 
at the same result for persons possessing only primary education. In conflict with what 
earlier studies have shown, we found that males have a better pay-off from training than 
females. Further, the results indicate that among immigrants, the pay-off from labor 
market training varies by origin. Thus the pay-off for a person from Eastern Europe was 
found to be better that for someone originating from another Nordic country.   41
Without additional knowledge it is difficult to offer a well-founded explanation for 
the finding that rewards were higher for foreign-born than for natives. One plausible 
explanation stems from the fact that natives and foreigners to some degree attended 
different training courses. Curriculum’s for the courses differ and this might provide a 
viable explanation for the difference across the two groups. Another reason could be 
that training reduces the foreigner’s reservation wage more than for natives, making 
them better prepared to accept job offers. A third explanation is that employers use a 
newly earned certificate for taking part in labor market training as a screening device 
when selecting foreign workers, but not when selecting native workers. 
The estimates imply that we have positive sorting into both training and non-training 
for both Swedish-born and foreign-born individuals indicating rational behavior with 
respect to the participation decision. Nevertheless the sorting structure differs between 
the Swedish-born and the foreign-born. Swedish-born people have a hierarchical 
structure while the foreign-born have a comparative advantage sorting structure. This 
difference is independent of the economic climate. 
Although we believe our study has produced new insights into the effects of Swedish 
labor market training, there are also limitations worth mentioning. For policy purposes, 
the most important limitation is that we have treated programs as one homogenous 
category. In reality, programs differ -- by curriculum and length, for example. It is an 
important task for future research to investigate if and how rewards differ along such 
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Appendix 
Tables 
Table A1 Model estimates for random coefficient model year 2 and 3 after the training 
period. Swedish-born  
Cohort 1  Cohort 2   Cohort 3   

























































































Age (26 - 45) 
 




















































































































































































































Log-likelihood  -3869.87 -3820.84 -3721.37 -4023.77 -4030.19 -4035.91 
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Table A2a Model estimates for random coefficient model year 2 and 3 after the training 
period. Foreign-born   
Cohort 1  Cohort 2   Cohort 3    




Age (26 - 45) 
 



















































































Age (26 - 45) 
 




















































































































































































































Log-likelihood -5363.4322  -5166.4741  -5492.8550  -5631.0375  -6169.0407  -6292.2393 
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Table A2b Extended variable specification of reward equation for foreign-born people  
  Cohort 1 (84/85)  Cohort 2 (87/88)  Cohort 3 (90/91) 
Variables 1986 1987 1990 1991 1993 1994 
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